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Constitutional protection of commercial speech has a curious
pedigree. Great free speech advocates-especially First Amend-
ment absolutists-have long struggled to expand the scope and
strength of speech protection. Often they have won. Many cate-
gories of speech now protected were once rejected as not having
constitutional status. Prominent First Amendment absolutists of-
ten led the legal fight on behalf of what might be called the "peo-
ple's darling privilege."' They argued for free speech in the con-
texts of' seditious libel and defamation, of artistic speech generally
and sexually explicit speech in particular, of indecent or profane
speech, and crucially of speech favoring radical and revolution-
ary-as well as racist and reactionary-ideologies. Free speech
battles still rage around various categories, with great "absolutist"
defenders of free speech historically being consistent defenders of
broader and stronger protection. Claims of "the people," that is,
political agitators going back to tea parties in Boston and the
"people out of doors," 2 abolitionists before the Civil War, labor
activists, and all sorts of political or moral crusaders (joined by
those who merely like a parade) eventually led the Supreme Court
in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization to the counter-
Nicholas F. Gallicchio Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
I take the evocative phrase from MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREFE SPEECH, "THiE PEOPLE'S
DARLING PRIVII.EGE": STRUG(ILES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY
(2000).
2 See generally PAULINE MAIER, FROM RESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION (1972); Larry D.
Kramer, The Suprene Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV, 4 (2001)
(discussing revolulionary activily in colonial America prior to the Declaration of Independence).
307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
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factual discovery of a tradition "out of mind" that offers people the
right to assemble and speak in parks and on the streets. 3 This ex-
pansive protection of speech freedom has possibly its most elegant
and forceful doctrinal elaborations in the work of great defenders
of an absolutist First Amendment-people such as the justice
Hugo Black, the scholar Thomas Emerson, or (though not so
clearly an absolutist) the political theorist John Stuart Mill. Each
sought to strengthen and expand the protection given speech free-
dom.
The curiosity is this: these, our strongest advocates of free
speech, each consistently rejected granting any protection to com-
mercial speech.4 John Stuart Mill, for example, although arguing
that a prohibition on the sale of strong drink should be impermis-
sible, concluded that "[tihe interest ... of these dealers in promot-
ing intemperance is a real evil and justifies the State in imposing
restrictions .. .. Neither Mill nor Black nor Emerson saw free-
dom of speech as about, or as including, a business's speech pro-
moting its sales and profits. Then, after the initial protective deci-
sions in the 1970s that churned sympathy as essentially consumer
protection cases,6 subsequent popular advocacy of constitutional
4 Justice Black joined the decision first rejecting protection for commercial speech in
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), a view that he later reaffirmed, writing sometimes
for the Court, sometimes for himself, and as far as I can find, never questioned. See Breard v.
City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 650 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) (explicitly approving Val-
entine); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943) (distinguishing distribution of handbills
raising funds for religion from handbills that are purely commercial); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 311,447, 640 (1970) (viewing commercial speech as part
of the "system of [commerce]," not the "system of freedom of expression"); Thomas L Emer-
son, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CAL. L. REV. 422, 458-61 (1980).
Another absolutist, Alexander Meiklejohn, also rejected First Amendment protection for com-
mercial speech. However, unlike the others mentioned, Meiklejohn was never in either the
Court's or the speech-protective tradition's mainstream because he believed in limiting First
Amendment protection of speech to political speech or speech relevant for democratic self-
government. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (Oxford Univ. Press 1966)
(1960).
5 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 99 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (1859) (emphasis
added). The quote above concluded a more exploratory discussion. Mill began by arguing in
Chapter V that "the principle of individual liberty is not involved in the doctrine of free trade,"
which he saw as subject to more and different limitations. Id. at 94. Mill asserts people must be
free "to exchange opinions" and "advise" about what they are permitted to do, except the issue
becomes "doubtful," and Mill does not "venture to decide" whether a different answer applies,
"when the instigator derives a personal benefit from his advice, when he makes it his occupa-
tion, for subsistence or pecuniary gain, to promote what society and the State consider to be an
evil." Id. at 97-99. Mill notes the argument that the State "cannot be acting wrongly in endeav-
oring to exclude the influence of solicitations which are not disinterested." Id. at 98. That is, his
caveat emphasizes that different considerations apply depending on the identity or role of the
speaker, not on the content of the speech. Implicitly following Mill, these are precisely the
factors that the majority in Nike use to distinguish commercial and non-commercial speech.
6 See generally Alan B. Morrison, How We Got the Commercial Speech Doctrine: An
Originalist's Recollections, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1189 (2004).
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protection for commercial speech has been powerfully promoted
by corporate interests-from groups such as the American Asso-
ciation of Advertising Agencies.
Recent arguments favoring commercial entities' free speech
often sound as if business enterprises are flesh and blood citizens
of the republic and, as such, are entitled participants in a public
sphere, rather than instrumental creations that we bring into legal
existence in order to serve our interests. It is as if society consists
of two opposing types of "beings," each equally worthy of moral
and legal concern-people and corporations. This is idiocy. Al-
though an opposing view is plausible, many free speech advocates
argue-I do-that generally the First Amendment forbids laws
restricting the speech of the rich in order to create a better balance
between the rich and the poor.7 In this debate, however, at least
the argument is over the rights of real people-poor people's
equality (or speech) claims purportedly on one side and rich peo-
ple's speech claims on the other. But when claims are made on
behalf of commercial entities, the conflict involves people's crea-
tions claiming rights over their creators.
Of course, my characterizations above paint too broadly. The
actual history of commercial speech is much more nuanced. This
history, however, is adequate for present purposes. I have written
extensively explaining why I think, at least in this regard, these
great theorists of speech freedom were right.9 There is no need to
repeat those arguments here. Rather this comment intends only to
make two brief points. The first answers an objection to content-
based regulation of (truthful) commercial speech that has become
much more prominent since I last wrote on the subject. 10 The ob-
7 Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) ("[T]he concept that the government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment .... "). Despite agreeing with this general
principle, I have argued that both doctrinal precedent and First Amendment theory show that
this principle is misapplied in the narrow context of campaign speech. See C. Edwin Baker,
Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1998).
8 For example, the first cases unambiguously protecting commercial speech can be seen
as essentially consumer protection cases. Moreover, the most intellectually powerful early work
favoring protection for commercial speech was a purely scholarly contribution. See Martin H.
Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971). Redish
shows that for any market place of ideas theory, which focuses on the importance of speech
content for listeners trying to find truth, wisdom, or other insight, excluding commercial speech
from First Amendment protection is misguided. Id.
9 See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 194-224 (1989); C.
Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1
(1976); C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and
Redish's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646 (1982) [hereinafter Realizing Self-
Realization]; C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons and
Presses, 1994 SuP. CT. REV. 57 [hereinafter Turner Broadcasting].
'0 See supra note 9.
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jection, probably most clearly asserted by Justice Thomas, is that
regulation of truthful commercial speech typically involves "an
asserted government interest in keeping people ignorant by sup-
pressing expression [that] 'is per se illegitimate."''  The second
point considers the relation between commercial speech and corpo-
rate political speech, an issue of arguably growing relevance.'
2
But first, as an ideal entree into these two matters, I will describe
the key conceptual point that distinguished the contending sides in
the Nike litigation. 13 This description suggests that the majority
position in the California Supreme Court not only provides the bet-
ter understanding at the level of case law of commercial speech,
but also provides the logic needed to address the two points I wish
to make.
I. THE DISPUTE IN NIKE
The key conceptual difference between the majority and dis-
sents in Nike concerned whether the central factor in identifying
commercial speech relates, as implied by the California Supreme
Court majority, to the commercial identity or role of the speaker,
or, as the dissents claimed, to the commercial content of the
speech. For each, if its side in this disagreement is accepted, its
other arguments follow quite persuasively.
As the majority emphasized, the expression at issue in Nike
was certainly sponsored by a corporate entity (although, of course,
made by its employees acting in their role as employees) aiming to
profit in the market for products or services. Moreover, the corpo-
rate entity directed this speech in important part at an audience
whose response could give or cost Nike sales and profits, with the
speech content directed at achieving the profitable response de-
sired by the speaker-in this case maintaining sales. 4 Of course,
if the identity or role of the speaker is the crucial factor making the
speech subject to regulation, it is neither disturbing nor surprising
that the regulated speech involves matters of public concern. Cor-
porate interest in matters of public concern is often keen. People's
" Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,
518 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)); see also Greater
New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 497 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (object-
ing to current commercial speech doctrine that "takes such paternalistic motives seriously).
12 Cf. McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003) (restricting corporate expenditures for
"electioneering communications").
13 See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. dismissed, 123 S. Ct. 2554
(2003).
14 Cf. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 256.
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(and legislators') factual and normative views about matters of
public concern often affect the corporation's opportunity for profit.
Thus, the majority-paraphrasing and citing Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.15 -
emphasizes that "commercial speech frequently and even normally
addresses matters of public concern."'
' 6
On the other hand, if the content is central, as the dissents as-
sume, then the challenged speech in Nike is as much concerned
with matters of public importance as is the clearly protected
speech of the media and public interest advocates that claimed that
Nike underpaid or mistreated foreign workers. Given a focus on
this content, a country with a "profound national commitment" to
"debate on public issues" must protect this content. 7 "Handicap-
ping one side in this important worldwide debate is both ill con-
sidered and unconstitutional. ' 8 Once the potentially informative
value of the content is the constitutional focus, the dissents prop-
erly make their other claim-that at least within public debate, the
content of the corporate speaker's contribution is as valuable as
that of any other speaker.
This difference between the two approaches is seen in key
precedents to which the majority and dissents looked for support.
The majority did not bother with either First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti 9 or Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Com-
merce,20 presumably because these cases are not traditionally con-
sidered commercial speech cases and the majority did not need
support from this quarter in order to identify Nike's speech as
commercial. Rather, both cases involved corporate participation in
politics. Not surprisingly, the dissents continually invoked Bel-
lotti, each heavily relying on its logic and each citing it five
times.2' Bellotti correctly tells us that the value of the expression
22in the marketplace of ideas does not depend on its source. The
immediate (but understandable) curiosity about the dissents, how-
15 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976). The Supreme Court is fully aware of this point, frequently repeating it. For example, it
observed that "many, if not most, products may be tied to public concerns about the environ-
ment, energy, economic policy, or individual health and safety." Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 n.5 (1980).
16 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 259.
17 Id. at 263 (Chin, J., dissenting); see also id. at 267 (arguing in dissent that Nike's
speech on public issues should be fully protected).
'8 Id. at 263.
'9 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
20 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
1 Kasky, 45 P.3d. at 263-68 (Chin, J., dissenting); id. at 268-80 (Brown, J., dissenting).
22 "The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does
not depend upon the identity of its source .... " Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777.
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ever, is that they never mention Austin. Austin denied protection
to market-oriented corporate political speakers,23 adopting reason-
ing almost identical to the dissent in Bellotti. Both opinions-the
dissent in Bellotti and the majority in Austin-emphasized the lack
of any necessary connection between corporate political expres-
sion, that is, the speaker, and anyone's personal political commit-
ments .24
The Court in Austin explained that the concern with corrup-
tion behind regulation of corporate expenditures was not necessar-
ily quid pro quo corruption. Rather, the democratic process could
be undermined by "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's
support for the corporation's political ideas."25 According to the
Court, the logical disconnect between the corporate treasury and
public support for the corporation's views is not due simply to a
matter of money-some corporations are not wealthy and some
individuals are. Moreover, the Court explicitly said the law was
not trying to equalize speakers; the law was not preventing expen-
ditures merely because of a corporation's potential wealth.26
Wealthy people are, but corporations are not, part of a democratic
public. The reason that "'[tihe resources in the treasury of a busi-
ness corporation ...are not an indication of popular support for
the corporation's political ideas [is because t]hey reflect instead the
economically motivated decisions of investors and customers.'
27
23 Austin, 494 U.S. at 669-75 (Brennan, J., concurring). I refer to "market oriented" cor-
porate speakers to distinguish them from incorporated, non-profit, advocacy groups-a point
that Brennan emphasized in distinguishing his concurrence in Austin from his opinion for the
Court in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238 (1986). See also
McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 698-99 (2003) (interpreting statutory restrictions on corpora-
tions', including non-profit corporations', electioneering speech as not applying to MCLF cor-
porations, for which the restriction would be invalid). More generally, unless otherwise implied
by context, henceforth references in this comment to "corporations" should be understood not
to include MCFL corporations but to all market-oriented commercial entities, including partner-
ships and sole proprietorships and entities receiving their support from (i.e., operating as con-
duits for) such entities. This usage reflects these enterprises' market orientation. All such en-
terprises are, to a significant extent, legal creations. For example, no entity that sells products in
a market would likely be able to exist without a tax deduction for business expenses.
24 Justice White, in his dissent, stated:
[A]n examination of the First Amendment values that corporate expression fur-
ther[] ... reveals that it is not fungible with communications emanating from indi-
viduals and is subject to restrictions which individual expression is not. Indeed,
what some have considered to be the principal function of the First Amendment, the
use of communication as a means of self-expression, self-realization, and self-
fulfillment, is not at all furthered by corporate speech.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 804-05 (White, J., dissenting).
25 Austin, 494 U.S. at 660 (emphasis added).
6 id.
27 Id. at 659 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 258).
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This is precisely the theory of the Bellotti dissent. Although Aus-
tin claimed to distinguish Bellotti,28 its logic totally undermined
the earlier case. Thus, it appears that the dissents in Nike may
have a good argument, but only by relying on a decision no longer
authoritative for the point they wish to assert-almost as if they
wished to explicitly rely on Lochner v. New York.29
Some comment on this dispute between the majority and dis-
sent is appropriate. Isolated quotations from the Supreme Court's
commercial speech cases can reasonably be seen to quite directly
support both sides. I have no interest here-this is not a brief-in
trying to either distinguish or reconcile them.3° Still, in dissent,
Justice Brown argues that the majority's "test violates fundamental
principles of First Amendment jurisprudence by making the level
of protection given speech dependent on the identity of the
speaker-and not just the speech's content ....,,31 There is no
such principle. I put aside the sometimes controversial areas
where the law directly distinguishes between speakers 32 and where
even the legitimacy of a regulation may depend on the speaker's
role or identity.33 Rather, the point important here is that a critical
element in all regulations of commercial speech upheld by the
28 The Court cited a footnote in Bellotti that limited the decision to the ballot measure con-
text. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 659, (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n. 26).
29 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
30 This doctrinal incoherency was noted early and clearly by Steven Shiffrin, The First
Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment,
78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1212 (1983). Little since has diminished the possibility to cite stray state-
ments in commercial speech precedent on either side of most disputes.
"' Kasky, 45 P.3d 243, 268 (Cal. 2002) (Brown, J., dissenting).
32 The Court says "differential taxation of speakers, even members of the press, does not
implicate the First Amendment unless the tax is directed at, or presents the danger of suppress-
ing, particular ideas." Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 453 (1991). Of course, as merely a
tax on, not a prohibition of, some speaker's speech, Medlock's importance may be limited.
Moreover, the tax applied independently of the speech content. But more routine are regula-
tions that apply only to government employees, see note 33 infra, or only to some wishful en-
trants into limited public forums or non-public forums. See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television
Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (allowing a public television broadcaster to exclude a
qualified political candidate from the candidate debate); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and
Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (allowing government to restrict which charities would
be allowed to participate in governmental employee charitable contribution drive); Regan v.
Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (allowing Congress to distinguish
between veteran organizations and other charities in their ability to receive tax exemption even
though they engage in political lobbying); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37 (1983) (upholding school district regulation allowing one union access to teacher
mailboxes while prohibiting denying access to rival union). An interesting aspect of Young v.
Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), is that apparently only adult theatres could show
adult films.
33 Consider, for example, restrictions on government employees-rather than government
created and empowered business entities-where it is precisely the identity or role of the
speaker that permits regulation. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548 (1973) (upholding the Hatch Act's restriction on government employee's electorally-
oriented speech).
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Court (or struck down, although not because they distinguish
commercial speakers from others saying the same thing34) is a fac-
tor almost the exact converse of Justice Brown's "fundamental
principle." These regulations do not prohibit all communication of
some particular content. Rather, they always only prohibit certain
(commercially interested) speakers from communicating the con-
tent.
Although in dissent, Justice Rehnquist first made this observa-
tion in Virginia State Board.35 There, the challenged law did not
ban publication or communication of drug price information.
Newspapers certainly could include a consumer's affair section
that provided that information. Good papers might do precisely
that. AARP could sensibly benefit its members by purchasing ad-
vertising space in newspapers in which AARP listed comparative
drug prices charged by different pharmacies, a worthy practice and
certainly not one restricted by the challenged law.36 Virginia State
Board is not alone. No other statute regulating the content of
commercial speech that has been upheld by the Court ever forbade
other, non-commercial speakers from communicating the restricted
content-that is, the law always allows communication of the con-
tent if communicated by a speaker who is not profiting in the
realm of the sale of goods and commercial services. (This is not to
imply that profiting turns the speaker's expression into commercial
speech. For it to be commercial speech, the speech must relate to
an interest in the sale of goods or services other than the speech
itself When the speech itself is the product and when the speech
is made available to an undifferentiated public, the seller is the
press, the one business that itself receives direct constitutional pro-
tection.) In the one case where the statute on its face appeared to
be a general prohibition on the content, the Court inserted this dis-
tinction among speakers. In upholding a law barring publication
of lottery information, the Court read the statute to apply only to
where the lottery information was presented as an advertisement
rather than as news or information by the media entity.37
34 In the one case that might be cited to support the dissent's principle, City of Cincinnati
v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993), the central problem with the law was that
regulation of commercial speakers simply did not rationally further the asserted state interest.
31 Virginia State Board, 425 U.S. 748, 782-83 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
36 Alternatively, as has been recently proposed in New York, a web site comparing differ-
ent pharmacies' prices for drugs could be set up. Michael Cooper, Comparing Drug Prices
Online, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2004, at B4.
37 The statute prohibited the broadcast of "any advertisement of or information concerning
any lottery." See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 422 n.1 (1993). The Court,
however, emphasized that the statute was construed not to cover "non-commercial information,"
presumably including the number of the winning ticket, but only "advertising." Id. at 424.
Similar distinctions based on the speaker's role in communicating identical content have been
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Thus, reflection and example show commercial speech is cru-
cially about the identity of the speaker. Though there is much
more to be said here, note that there are at least two, not necessar-
ily inconsistent, reasons why this focus makes sense. First, prag-
matically, commercial speech is routinely thought to be both hardy
and verifiable. Business enterprises' profit needs will keep them
interested in commercial promotion as long as the promotion is at
least minimally within the bounds of law---chill here may not be
such a concern as with other speech where alternative communica-
tions can serve the publisher or author almost as well as the chilled
speech.38 Moreover, unlike newspapers, which even without the
time pressures of publishing deadlines will seldom be in position
to have certain knowledge of truth or falsity, business enterprises
will have more and easier access to the truth about their speech,
certainly their speech about their products or organization, than the
typical speaker will have when talking about public affairs. Invok-
ing numerous Supreme Court statements, the Nike court relied on
central to lower courts' application of the Lanham Act. In these cases, courts typically find a
book or article itself to be protected non-commercial speech, despite being published or written
by a party who has an interest in a product praised by the publication, or in a product in compe-
tition with a product disparaged by the publication. In this situation, the speaker is an author-
for example, an academic researcher or a reporter--or publisher, The court, however, then finds
the same publication to be unprotected when distributed for free (for example, at trade shows or
mailed) to potential customers by the entity whose product is (comparatively) favored. Now the
speaker is a commercial promoter of a product. See, e.g., Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers v.
Am. Inst. of Physics, 859 F. Supp. 1521, 1544 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that authors' articles
and letters to the editor were protected when initially published, but protection not extended to
promotional copies distributed for the purpose of selling authors' work); cf Oxycal Lab., Inc. v.
Jeffers, 909 F. Supp. 719, 725 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (explaining that protection of the book followed
because the factors, such as promotional use of the book, found relevant in Semco, Inc. v. Am-
cast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 114 (6th Cir. 1995) were not present). Moreover, lack of protection
when a party uses the material this way follows even as to the same party who was protected in
the role of writer or publisher. In other words, the same content can be commercial speech or an
exercise of freedom of the press depending not on its content but on the role of the speaker. Cf
Semco, Inc. v. Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 114 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding it clear that even the
Lanham Act did not cover authoring the article itself-although in the unusual circumstances of
this case, the court thought it did-the Act covered the use of reprints of the article at trade
shows). The dissents in Nike, which relied (or, I argue, misrelied) on Gordon & Breach and
Oxycal, failed to understand the point emphasized in these cases. See Kasky, 45 P.3d 243, 273-
74, 276-77 (Cal. 2002). I suspect this failure reflects the dissents' assumption that the relevant
concern must be content, not speaker identity or role.
38 Though Nike argues that potential liability for false speech will dramatically chill its
speech, there is another possibility. When the speech is true, profit concerns will encourage the
corporate entity to make the speech. My colleague, Jason Johnston, has argued that liability for
falsehood could have a highly beneficial economic effect of encouraging corporate responsibil-
ity. By reducing corporations' protection for dissembling in their public statements, the law
gives a "clean" firm a competitive advantage by being able to publicize that it acts responsibly.
See Jason Johnston, Signaling Social Responsibility: An Economic Analysis of the Role of
Disclosure and Liability Rules in Influencing Market Incentives for Corporate Social and Envi-
ronmental Performance (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Certainly, en-
couraging corporate "green" behavior is an important societal interest that could provide a justi-
fication in addition to consumer protection for the law challenged in Nike.
2004]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
these two reasons in explaining the propriety of imposing greater
duties of accuracy on commercial speakers than on noncommercial
speakers discussing the same matters.39
Second, from the beginning, in Virginia State Board, the
Court never saw protection of commercial speech as based on any
normative status of the corporation itself. The Court's concern
always reflected listeners' interest in "cleanly flowing" informa-
tion that commercial speakers can presumably provide. That is,
the Court treats the corporate speaker as meriting whatever consti-
tutional protection the Court offers because of how the commercial
speaker can serve recipients' information needs. The Court rea-
sonably saw the speech limitations struck down in the early cases
as merely protecting economic interests at the expense of consum-
ers. In contrast, a free and democratic society must respect its citi-
zen speakers' participation in the public sphere.4° Likewise, any
moral concept of individual autonomy, respect for which may be
implicit in any legal capacity to justify its claim of creating obliga-
41tory law, must protect the liberty of individuals to express them-
selves.
Business enterprises-with their special legal status, for ex-
ample, their privileged deduction of expenses from income, as well
as burdens regularly imposed by countless laws only on commer-
cial engagement in particular activities-are, like commercial
speech, instrumentally valuable. Undoubtedly, corporations serve
society's material needs and interests, especially when they act as
the law proscribes. But it is a perverse notion of either ethics or
humanity to think that such instrumentalities have any guaranteed
or fundamentally protected place in public discourse-in the dis-
cussions in which people have a right to participate when forming
their views. Of course, Justice Stewart and Justice Brennan prop-
erly remind us that a democracy also depends on giving one type
of usually commercial enterprise special constitutional protec-
42tion. The Fourth Estate receives First Amendment protection,
not in its own behalf, but because of its instrumental contribution
'9 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 252-53.
40 See Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977), for an example of how, for speech purposes, the notion of citizen
participation in the public sphere may also apply to at least resident aliens, a conclusion that in
any event follows from the next sentence in the text above.
41 C. Edwin Baker, Foundations of the Possibility of Legitimate Law (Nov. 2003) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the author).
42 Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Address, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173 (1979); Potter Stew-
art, "Or of the Press", 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975). Generally, the practical and normative
difficulty of distinguishing the media from other commercial enterprises is, I think, a red herring
routinely brought up by those opposing regulation of corporate speech. See generally Turner
Broadcasting, supra note 9.
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to democracy and to a non-governmentally dictated culture. This
feature, for example, easily justifies protection of media commen-
tary from regulation that is constitutional if imposed on other busi-
ness enterprises.
43
On this view that the lesser status of commercial speech re-
flects the identity or role of the speaker, the Nike dissents' contin-
ual worry about "[hiandicapping one side in [an] important
worldwide debate" 44 or stifling certain speakers45 is factually con-
tentious and normatively misguided. No individual, no citizen,
and no press entity on either side of any debate is prevented from
speaking, from saying or publishing what they want. "Capitalists"
or passionate supporters of unregulated markets-or of Nike in
particular-are just as free to speak as are workers or public inter-
est groups or tax-and-spend liberals. Of course, such debates will
often be somewhat unbalanced, if not incredibly one sided-plenty
of people are handicapped in their participation in the public
sphere due to lack of wealth. Rather, those who have greater
wealth, often due to their ownership of business entities (or their
salaries as managers' of corporate entities), as well as the normally
very pro-establishment press, 46 will typically be vastly overrepre-
sented in debate. Nevertheless, rather than call this distortion, the
Court wisely concludes that this situation neither violates the free
speech of those less well situated nor in itself justifies restricting
anyone's speech.47 Any regulation of commercial speech leaves
people on all sides of the world-wide debate completely free to
present their views and their understanding of the facts.
In contrast, the lesser status of commercial speech does con-
tradict a different value asserted by Justice Brown-to "maxi-
mize[] the ability of businesses to participate in the public de-
bate. 48 But this value is simply not one that a free and democratic
people need recognize. A limitation on this speech is not a distor-
43 McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 697-98 (2003). In addition to collecting other ex-
amples, the Court quoted and relied upon Austin's statement: "A valid distinction ... exists
between corporations that are part of the media industry and other corporations that are not
involved in the regular business of imparting news to the public." Id. at 697 (citation omitted).
Many otherwise difficult-to-justify cases would have been easy if courts had recognized the
constitutional relevance of this distinction.
4 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 263 (Chin, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 268, 271 (Brown, J., dissenting); see also Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554,
2567-68 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
46 See, e.g., EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA 1-35 (Pantheon Books 2d ed. 2002) (describing
mechanisms producing dominance by establishment and conservative corporate interests in the
mass media); ROBERT M. MCCHESNEY, THE PROBLEM OF THE MEDIA (2004).
47 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
41 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 270 (Brown, J., dissenting).
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tion of debate49 but a reservation of the debate for the free flesh
and blood people whose moral status, as well as whose interests,
must be seen as underlying the Constitution.
II. PATERNALISM-GOING BACK TO VIRGINIA STATE BOARD50
With these observations about Nike, I can return to the first of
the two points of this comment. If Justice Thomas is right that
regulation of the content of truthful commercial speech is based on
"an asserted government interest in keeping people ignorant," his
objection should have, as it appears to increasingly have, 51 consid-
erable appeal. Essentially the objection is to paternalism. Of
course, a government interest in keeping people ignorant (e.g.,
non-disclosure of information in its files) is often entirely legiti-
mate, approved by virtually everyone. The Privacy Act of 197452
is merely one example of the government acting to keep people
ignorant of information within its files.53  Government non-
disclosure of information in national security, financial regulation,
and law enforcement contexts also are designed to keep the public,
at least for a while, ignorant. Still, in the commercial speech con-
text, the sting of Thomas' complaint is that, to many observers,
content-based restrictions on non-misleading, truthful commercial
speech seldom seems explicable except on paternalistic grounds or
on the view that (some) consumers cannot be trusted to respond to
49 Distortion, of course, has no natural meaning. Is debate distorted when the poor have
less resources with which to participate than the rich? Rather, the First Amendment as imple-
mented by the Court is more concerned with suppression than distortion. Of course, this poses
the question of whether commercial entities, other than the press, have the same right not to be
suppressed that individuals have. No Supreme Court opinion suggests that conclusion-rather,
the limited protection given corporate speech typically is justified instrumentally.
50 The Court in Virginia State Board, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976), critiqued regulation of
truthful, non-misleading commercial speech as paternalistic and held that the First Amendment
required a non-paternalistic approach. The most theoretically significant shift made by Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), was to ap-
prove the notion that the government could have a proper interest in keeping a commercial
speaker from participating, even truthfully, in the public discussion of matters important to an
individual decision maker. See Shiffrin, supra note 30. Of course, whether Virginia State
Board was correct initially to characterize the regulation of truthful commercial speech as a
paternalistic effort to keep people ignorant is precisely the question raised in the text.
51 Though going back to Virginia State Board, 425 U.S. at 770, the appeal of the anti-
paternalism argument has taken off more recently. Doing a LEXIS search of "commercial
speech w/15 paternalis!", I found an average of 2.1 articles annually during the 1983 to 1991
period, but 12.1 articles annually during the 1994 to 2003 period. For someone who has long
advocated seeing freedom of speech through the perspective of liberty or autonomy, the pater-
nalism trope should be pleasing-except, I argue, that it misconceives the context of commercial
speech.
52 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000).
53 See C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Informational Privacy or Gossip: The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment, 21 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y (forthcoming 2004). Consider also all
the other exceptions to typical Freedom of Information Acts ("FOIAs").
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information in a socially responsible way. That is, the government
acts on the belief that a consumer cannot be trusted to take care of
herself in deciding about tobacco use or gambling or buying from
irresponsible cut-rate pharmacists, or to act in a socially responsi-
ble fashion in deciding on electricity usage, especially during peri-
ods of peak demand. Certainly, anyone who sees the underlying
premise of the First Amendment to involve a demand that the gov-
ernment respect individual autonomy should find such paternalism
offensive.
A distinction-between descriptive and ascriptive (or formal)
autonomy-that has been either explicit or implicit in various as-
sertedly autonomy-based theories of free speech helps make initial
sense of the paternalism claim.54 An analysis emphasizing descrip-
tive autonomy or an instrumental concern with autonomy is likely
to value information that commercial speech (potentially) pro-
vides55 --just as it would give a basis for a rebuttable demand that
government provide information or grant access to government
facilities or records. 56 In contrast, an ascriptive or formal concep-
tion of the expressive autonomy makes no general, instrumentalist
demands for the availability of information as a matter of constitu-
tional right as opposed to as a sometimes appropriate public pol-
icy. Instead, the only claim of this formal conception of autonomy
is that the person, the autonomous agent, must be allowed to act
or, more specifically, to speak and listen, as she chooses.
Both senses of autonomy, however, should be offended by
government paternalism as a reason to restrict the rights that their
respective view of autonomy requires protecting. A goal of keep-
ing people ignorant for their own good or because they cannot
'4 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875 (1994); cf
Baker, supra note 53; Baker, Turner Broadcasting, supra note 9, at 72-79.
55 See, e.g., T. M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40
U. PrrT. L. REV. 519 (1979); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expres-
sion, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991); see also, Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982). In its implications for First Amendment theory, this descriptive
sense of autonomy differs little from the marketplace of ideas or, although limited to the politi-
cal sphere, what Robert Post describes as the Meikeljohnian theory of the First Amendment,
which Post critiques in favor of a public discourse or participatory theory of democracy. The
later is almost identical to what I describe as the formal or ascriptive theory of autonomy, the
position I defend as most basic to free speech. See Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of
Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2000). This descriptive conception of auton-
omy-a market place of ideas or a Meiklejohn theory of democracy-clearly provides the best
basis for understanding the Court's original protection of commercial speech in Virginia State
Board.
5 Despite his expressed concerns, Justice Thomas sometimes strains to approve of gov-
ernment attempts to keep people ignorant even when statutes (here, federal labor laws) appear to
give certain members of the public (here, those associated within a labor union) a right to infor-
mation. See U.S. Dept. of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487 (1994).
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properly handle the truth should at best be, as Justice Thomas sug-
gests, 57 offensive. Thus, any defender of restricting truthful, non-
misleading commercial information should wonder whether there
is, should hope there is, a more persuasive-and more accept-
able-description of the government's interest than Thomas' char-
acterization.
The hint of a better description of the government's interest
can be found in my earlier discussion of Nike. If, as the dissents in
Nike thought, commercial speech were identified solely on the ba-
sis of its content, what other than a government interest in prevent-
ing recipients from getting the suppressed content could explain
the law? But this method of identifying commercial speech and
the consequent plausible government interests in its regulation is
descriptively simply wrong. An interest in keeping people in igno-
rance would require the law to bar all speech with the specified
content. As noted, that never occurs. The restrictions never
broadly cover a category of content. Rather, they always apply to
particular speakers-those engaged in a commercial activity who
have a commercial interest in that content and who would commu-
nicate the content. Therefore, the law cannot rationally be under-
stood to have, as its goal, keeping people in ignorance. Thus, the
questions become: (1) What government interest could there be in
restricting this speaker; and (2) does this speaker have constitu-
tional grounds for complaint?
The simple answer is that an appropriate government concern
is with the integrity of a discourse in which people develop their
own views on the basis of dialogue with other individuals who
have views on the subject. Partly because the views of a commer-
cial speaker are structurally determined, the state could reasonably
want to exclude this speaker from the discourse-that was essen-
tially John Stuart Mill's suggestion.58 The state concern need not
reflect an inherent objection to the content of any view-nor to an
interest in keeping people ignorant of any content. The reason for
regulation is presumably a concern that participation by this
speaker distorts the (constitutionally protected and valued) dia-
logue. Of course, the exclusion might produce bad conse-
quences-but evaluations of this type of trade-off is the normal
task of legislative bodies. But, emphatically, the government in-
terest is precisely in restricting those speakers, which the law does
precisely, not in keeping people in ignorance of certain content, a
task for which the law is overtly ill-designed. The law allows all
57 See supra note 11.5s See supra note 5.
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content to be supplied and any ignorance removed by the speech of
other individuals, non-commercial organizations, and the press.
Several observations might elaborate the above characteriza-
tion of this state interest. The first relates to the commercial en-
terprise's presumed (and often legally required) profit-oriented
interest in its speech. Elsewhere I have emphasized that this orien-
tation of its speech is structurally determined and is causally inde-
pendent of any other substantive values in a way that is not true for
what might otherwise seem parallel situations. 59 Consider, for ex-
ample, the charity soliciting contributions, the politician soliciting
votes, or the preacher who, while seeking to save souls, "passes
the collection plate." Structurally, it is always possible-and in
practice sometimes, probably often, the case-that charities choose
to engage in speech and other activities that they realize will be
unpopular in some quarters and may diminish their fund raising
appeal. They do so precisely because their members or volunteers
believe in this speech or those activities. Much of the legal sys-
tem's treatment of charities-for example, the tax status of the
charity and the contributions of their contributors-may be prem-
ised precisely on the belief, first, that the nature of these entities
leaves them free to make value-based, not profit- or revenue-
based, choices, and second, that the opportunity to make such pub-
lic-oriented, value-based choices merits societal support.6° Like-
wise, a democratic political order assumes that a politician can,
and in some cases will, choose her speech not merely with the de-
sign to get elected, but rather to present her ideas and ideals. She,
of course, often does this with the hope that it will, but sometimes
with an honest recognition that it will not, lead to her election.
Finally, the preacher might, usually it is hoped she does, formulate
her sermon, just as she passes the plate, out of a belief that both
these acts express and further values to which she is committed but
without regard to whether what she says increases or deters contri-
butions.
In contrast, the general orientation of the commercial
speaker's message is structurally and legally determined. Enter-
prise survival in a competitive market and, even in non-
5' See sources cited, supra note 9.
60 The situation is more mixed when the charity relies on a professional fund raising busi-
ness that differs little from a telemarketer. The Court's analysis gave protection to the speech in
this context, saying that the commercial element was "inextricably intertwined" with the chari-
table aspects. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988). I will not try
to analyze this complex issue here, but the immediate observation is that, normally, an individ-
ual (or presumably an association) who has speech freedom does not lose that freedom because
she hires a profit-oriented business to help her get her message out. If that were not true, many
cases, including Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), would make tittle sense.
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competitive markets, rests upon legal obligations to owners typi-
cally requiring efficient pursuit of profits. But put aside this dis-
tinction between speech that is chosen and presumptively repre-
sents a person's values and speech that, though it may happen to
coincide with a person's values, has no such necessary or intrinsic
connection to a person's values but instead is structurally or le-
gally determined. Rather, consider the possibility that a society
values a public sphere in which flesh and blood people form and
express their values, possibly not just about politics but also about
culture and even about individual consumption goals or aims or
preferences. If a free society must, or a given society does, value
such a sphere, the law should not abridge these flesh and blood
people's right to participate in this sphere. But expression coming
from speakers who have no rightful (or constitutional) basis to be
part of this public sphere is different. 61 No doubt their speech, like
all communications, can be influential-can effect people's deci-
sions. And, like the speech of government (another legal creation
designed to serve people), its speech sometimes serves public dis-
course. But an economic entity, a commercial speaker (that is, a
person acting in that role), is like a governmental entity62 but
unlike flesh and blood individuals in what might be called the
"lifeworld." Commercial entities, like governmental entities, are
instrumentally valued legal creations and function in ways pro-
vided (and restricted) by law. There is no reason to grant such an
entity influence or empowerment in the public sphere. Allowing
this entity to speak in the dialogue among individuals could be
seen as unfairly advantaging one viewpoint in the discussion-the
view favoring maximum consumption of goods and services or
favoring any other acts or attitudes that are profitable for the
6 1 A central theme of one of the best recent articles on commercial speech explains that,
although commercial speech may have First Amendment value when contributing useful infor-
mation to "public discourse," this quality provides a lesser First Amendment status as compared
to the more central First Amendment rights guaranteed to those who must be considered rightful
participants in that discourse, a distinction that the author shows explains much of the more
concrete aspects of commercial speech doctrine. Post, supra note 55; see also Burt Neubome,
The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 BROOK.L.REV.
(1989) (offering a similar two level theory that justifies some but limited protection of commer-
cial speech for serving an informational function, a instrumental role that can be contrasted to
the more basic individual liberty justification for greater protection of other speech).
62 See Anderson v. City of Boston, 380 N.E.2d 628 (Mass. 1978), appeal dismissed, 439
U.S. 1060 (1979) (upholding Massachusetts' restriction on Boston's speech). The issue of
whether government participation in public discourse should be allowed has been canvassed, but
the clear answer is that, like corporate participation, government participation can make valu-
able contributions and, therefore, people should be able to democratically decide when, and to
what extent, to allow it. See generally MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLI-
TICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983); Steven Shiffrin, Government
Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980).
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commercial entity. Commercial speech would then unfairly "dis-
tort" public discourse. In a free society, the (in this respect, stu-
pid) peer group of a teenage girl has a right to try to convince her,
just as I have a right to write (an equally stupid) book to convince
her, that smoking is "cool." But there is no reason why a free so-
ciety need give that right to a (non-media) economic entity, such
as a tobacco company.
Thus, freedom requires the possibility of expressing views fa-
voring, as well as opposing, the consumption or other acts or atti-
tudes favored by the commercial entity. But this norm only re-
quires expressive freedom for freely-choosing individuals-people
whose freedom properly has moral status and, in the First Amend-
nent view that emphasizes autonomy and objects to paternalism,
constitutional status. A free individual should also have the right
to listen-or not be prevented from listening-to these peoples'
communications (or at least to speakers who want her to hear).
Moreover, she may have an interest in hearing from other enti-
ties-advertisers or the government-just as she might have an
interest in such entities devoting resources to the further develop-
ment of scientific or other types of information that she would find
useful. When enough people have any of these interests, they can
adopt laws that allow or require these uses of resources by either
corporations or government. Security laws and FOIAs commonly
require-or restrict-speech and sometimes require use of re-
sources to develop information on the part of either corporations or
government. Alternatively, a free individual might find coimuni-
cations (or development of new information by these entities) ei-
ther to distort public discussion or to waste societal resources. The
speech (or information development) roles of these instrumentally
valuable entities that best serve people's interests is a political is-
sue about which people disagree but which they have a right to
determine collectively. In any event, the state's possible interest
in regulating this commercial speaker is not an interest in keeping
people in ignorance, not paternalism about what a person should
know or hear. Rather an appropriate interest in regulating particu-
lar truthful content could involve a judgment about proper partici-
pation in discourse on the particular subject and about the proper
use and role of resources routinely subject to public, political con-
trol. The state must decide whether to reject or allow this partici-
patory role on behalf of its own creation, on behalf of instrumen-
tally valued entities whose orientation is generally structurally de-
termined by the market.
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Of course, any legal rule, certainly any legal regulation of
"willing" interactions or exchanges, can be characterized as pater-
nalistic. This is certainly true for all the economic regulations rou-
tinely approved by the Court in the post-Lochner world. The point
of such regulations, however, is alternatively described as regulat-
ing uses of economic power in behalf of some public good that
could otherwise be undermined by unregulated pursuit of interest
by various economic actors. The "public good" might be safety,
aesthetics, economic fairness, a collective view of proper market
behavior and competition, or empowerment of particular groups-
each determined on the basis of collective (political) conclusions
of desirability. In the case of regulation of commercial entities'
speech, the interest is not and should not be seen as keeping people
in ignorance. Rather, it is often an interest in structuring a dialogic
and economic environment in a manner that people acting collec-
tively believe best serves their discursive and material interests.
These interests might be served by barring participation by these
entities. Alternatively, they might be served by compelling
speech-compare mandated disclosures and labeling. Or they
might be served by allowing expressive participation on particular
terms-for example, when the commercial entities take special
responsibility for the truth or non-misleading quality of their con-
tributions. All legal regulation of commercial entities (or people
acting in commercial roles) involves collective judgments about
conditions under which community self-definition, distributive
fairness, and individual freedom (including substantive discourses)
will best flourish.
Limiting people's opportunity to use legislative power to
regulate commercial actors, including these actors' speech, out of
some view that the regulation is not really in people's interest, is
what should be described as paternalism. This is the judicial pa-
ternalism rejected ever since the demise of Lochner. From this
view, it would be the Court, if it protects commercial speech and
invalidates rationally designed legislative (presumably people's)
choices to regulate these commercial entities' participation, that
should be tagged with the paternalistic label.
III. A CORPORATION IS NOT A CITIZEN
Obviously vital to the proper resolution of Nike is whether
commercial content or, alternatively, commercial speaker-identity
is the feature justifying reduced constitutional protection for com-
mercial speech. If the focus is narrowed to content, Nike's speech
must receive full First Amendment protection because of its obvi-
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ous relevance to issues of public importance and debate. That is,
Nike's (assertedly false) communications obviously involved im-
portant public issues even though they were also obviously and
equally related to Nike's economic interests, i.e., its all-important
image among present and potential customers.63 The point was
well made in Bellotti: "The inherent worth of the speech in terms
of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the
identity of its source . . . ."64 And, as noted earlier, the dissents in
Nike continually relied on this observation.
The problem is that not only in the context of explicitly com-
mercial speech do statutes say, but also in explicitly political con-
texts the Court holds, that the speaker's identity is crucial. Thus,
as noted earlier, although the Court in Austin could hardly deny the
truth of Bellotti's observation, it totally rejected the observation's
constitutional relevance. Instead, Austin emphasized that funds in
the corporate treasury "have little or no correlation to the public's
support for the corporation's political ideas. 65  The Court has
more recently explained, "Congress' power to prohibit corpora-
tions and unions from using funds in their treasuries to finance ad-
vertisements expressly advocating the election or defeat of candi-
dates in federal elections has been firmly embedded in our law. 66
In contrast, even in the corporate context, the First Amend-
ment provides protection when the speech is based on flesh and
blood individuals' (financial-that is, the system still favors those
with wealth) support. Thus, whenever the Court upholds restric-
tions specifically on corporate political speech, the restriction still
allows speech of PACs connected to the corporation, as long as the
PACs get their money from individual contributors.67 This option
transforms the political expenditure from one rooted in the corpo-
63 It may be assumed that if speech content has attributes of more than one category, it
should be analyzed under the more protected category. For example, sexually explicit speech,
despite offensiveness and pruriency concerns, receives protection if it has serious importance of
a variety of types. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). However, despite being other-
wise fully protected content, the law restricts non-copyright holders in their use of another per-
son's expression. And despite its political relevance, the law can regulate political speech that
flunks the Brandenburg test. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Thus, this as-
sumption may require more precise analysis for when it is applicable. I offer the assumption
here only to show the initial plausibility of Nike's claim given a single-minded focus on content.
6 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).
6- Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
66 McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 694 (2003).
67 In McConnell, the majority claimed that the PAC option meant there was no complete
ban on corporate expression. Id. at 695. Still, Justice Kennedy's dissent, citing Justice Scalia's
dissent in Austin, seems persuasive that the law bars speech by the corporation as a corporation.
Id. at 765-66 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). For my purposes, the crucial point is that requiring the
money go through the PAC means that individuals acting as individuals, not just those in corpo-
rate roles, choose to support the speech.
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ration to one ultimately decided upon by an individual who uses
her own money and initiates the expenditure independently of the
corporation. In other words, the law makes the identity of the ul-
timate source of the speech determinative for whether the election-
eering speech is allowed. It is allowed if it is financed by an indi-
vidual, but not if by the corporation itself. The point could not be
more obvious. Identity, not content, is crucial to constitutional
protection. Likewise, presumably the constitution requires exemp-
tion for so-called MCFL corporations 68 precisely because their use
of treasury funds for speech can be assumed to represent actual
support of individuals who make the contributions. These corpora-
tions are identified not merely by being non-profit, but by not re-
ceiving corporate or union contributions and by being created for
the "express purpose of promoting [their] political ideas., 69 These
features assure, as the Court emphasizes, that their "political re-
sources reflect political support."7°
Despite Bellotti's crucial point that the capacity of speech to
inform does not depend on the identity of the source, the Court in
Austin and McConnell showed that corporate commercial identity
is crucial in the constitutional justification of the regulations. The
Nike dissents simply ignored Austin's implicit rejection of the
relevance of this point of Bellotti (and, of course, given the timing,
the Nike dissents had no reason to address how McConnell contra-
dicts their analysis). In contrast, Justice Kennedy's dissent in
McConnell did not ignore Austin-instead he confirmed that it has
the importance I attribute to it here. Kennedy saw how much of
the McConnell majority's reasoning depended on Austin's rejec-
tion of Bellotti's premise that the identity of the speaker does not
matter. But rather than conclude, as the Nike dissents should have,
that this undermined his position, he could do what these Califor-
nia judges could not do. Justice Kennedy argued that Austin
should be overruled.71 He implicitly shows that the Nike dissents
may make doctrinal sense-but only if those on the Supreme Court
who have dissented for the last thirteen years had prevailed.
These cases make evident that there are not two doctrinally
distinct categories-corporate commercial speech and corporate
68 See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986). Protection for MCFL
corporations was treated as necessary in McConnell. In interpreting an ambiguous statute, the
Court assumed Congress would not have written the statute to restrict such corporations, since
that would make the statute unconstitutional. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 698-99.
69 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 699 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 264).
70 id.
71 Id. at 762 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also id. at 762-66 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (cri-
tiquing Austin and suggesting what I asserted earlier, that Austin effectively rejects Bellotti).
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political speech-but one meaningful category, speech of market-
oriented commercial enterprises (and the non-profit entities that
they in a sense sponsor).72 There remains for consideration the
normative appeal of the majority position. One approach would
simply repeat arguments that theorists have offered for why com-
mercial speech in general should not receive protection.73 But pos-
sibly more to the point is citizenship,74 the public sphere, and the
proper extent of the public's power, acting through the state, to
establish the boundaries of that sphere.
Business entities, of course, make absolutely essential contri-
butions to our material life. They provide jobs, income, and prod-
ucts and services to purchase with that income. The Court in Vir-
ginia State Board emphasized an additional contribution they can
make to people's lives-they can provide (and can be required to
provide) useful information. 75 The Court, however, has recognized
that this contribution is not beyond legal regulation, especially
when people can reasonably conclude that the contribution is not
useful. Thus, the public's interest in information would not likely
apply if the information were false or misleading. Such attributes
would be sufficient, the Court said in Virginia State Board, to jus-
tify regulation of commercial speech. This follows since it is the
public's interest in the speech, according to the Court, that justifies
providing First Amendment protection. In contrast, these listener
interests in the quality of information received are insufficient to
justify regulation of speakers who have rights in their own be-
half.76  In Central Hudson the Court saw that there may be addi-
72 In addition to the Chamber of Commerce in Austin, and the Court's carving out of
MCFL corporations from other non-profits, consider O'Connor's argument that the reason for
the Jaycees' reduced associational rights is tied to the Jaycees' connection with the commercial
sector. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 631 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
cf NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (granting greater First Amendment protection to
non-profit advocacy association).
73 I took this approach in Realizing Self-Realization, supra note 9.
74 I use "citizenship" not in terms of strict legal definitions but more metaphorically to re-
fer to flesh and blood individuals who have a stake in our legal order and are presumably bound
by our laws. See Karst, supra note 40, at 43-45. Compare the statutory language in the Act
challenged in McConnell purporting to provide an exception "if the communication is paid for
exclusively by funds provided directly by individuals who are United States citizens or nationals
or lawfully admitted for permanent residence." McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 698.
75 The Court in Virginia State Board was quite explicit about protecting commercial
speech not on the basis of business entities having rights as such, but because of their provision
of information to the public. 425 U.S. 748, 763-73 (1976); see also id. at 771-2 (stating that the
state can assure that commercial information "flow cleanly as well as freely," presumably be-
cause the reason for protecting the speech is to provide information to the public); Central Hud-
son, 447 U.S. at 563 ("The First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the
informational function of advertising").
76 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (protecting the Times as well as
the individuals who placed the advisement from liability unless they knew of the falsity or were
in reckless disregard of its falsity). I have a constant bemused daydream. Think of the silence
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tional reasons to think the business enterprises' speech is not serv-
ing us. Though individuals' speech and media communications on
issues such as whether to smoke, gamble, or use more electricity
must remain unrestricted, the Court saw that whether the commer-
cial enterprise's contribution to these discussions should be seen as
useful or distortive is properly a political decision on how we want
to structure the dialogue. The Court in Austin and McConnell
reached the same conclusion.
There can be no doubt. Corporate communications, whether
directed to investors where they presently are subject to numerous
legal conditions on what they must and must not say, or to em-
ployees where the speech is subject to considerable content regula-
tion by the NLRB, to their customers, or to the broader public,
serve very valuable functions. Corporate communications often
provide valuable information. Moreover, commercial advertising
sometimes promotes a more vibrant economy. It also often helps
support the non-advertising content of the mass media that play
such a vital role in the public sphere. 7
Thus, why would a society want, as it obviously often does, to
regulate corporate speech? First, it is only their truthful, non-
misleading speech that serves the public. That caveat, however,
might be said to apply to all speakers-though, as the Court has
indicated, attributes of hardiness and a corporation's greater, more
unique access to the truth of the information it provides might jus-
tify imposing greater demands of truthfulness on commercial
speakers. 78 Thus, there must be an additional factor. Unlike indi-
viduals, economic entities have no ultimate moral worth. Unlike
the individual people who have roles within them, corporations are
not citizens. They have no right to vote. 79 Especially since the
demise of Lochner, they have been generally subject to regulation
to make them better serve the public's (legally expressed) concep-
tion of the public's interest. As (instrumentally valuable) creatures
in the political realm we would have if candidates for office were barred from making mislead-
ing statements.
77 This benefit is hardly unambiguous-advertising can also produce huge distortions and
corruption of media content. See C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS,
at ix. (1994) ("[A]dvertising seriously distorts and diminishes the mass media's contribution to a
free and democratic society.").
'8 Virginia State Board, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
79 In the most prominent case where corporations were granted a vote in an American po-
litical unit, individual residents were denied a vote, unless they owned property. The case,
however, should probably be seen as the legislature and the Court treating these "governmental"
units as essentially commercial enterprises that merely took the outward form of a municipal
corporation. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973)
(piercing the "government veil").
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of law, society should allow their speech-or other activities-
only when and in ways that it serves human aims.
Second, even truthful corporate communications can be prob-
lematic. Regulation can be favored because corporate communica-
tions can be disruptive or distortive of the dialogue between indi-
viduals that, along with the explicitly constitutionally protected
communications of the press, make up a democratic public sphere.
Some twenty years ago, Steve Shiffrin, after reporting that
"[aidvertisers spend some sixty billion dollars per year," suggested
that those "who would oppose the materialist message must com-
bat forces that have a massive economic advantage., 8 0 Commer-
cial expenditures on promoting private possession of material
goods and private provision of services may well be at least part of
the explanation why the United States spends so little of its na-
tional wealth on (non-military) public goods, paid for with tax dol-
lars, and so much on private, individual market purchases.8 1  In
1996, a single company, Philip Morris, spent more on advertising
and related marketing practices than all the candidates, including
the presidential candidates, reportedly spent on their campaigns.82
These expenditures may reflect that the choice among tobacco
products (and other consumer goods) is vastly more important to
our happiness, our welfare, our country and the future of the world
than is the choice of a Congress and a President. But I do not
think so.
As a society and as individuals, we should and can often bene-
fit from corporate communications. For this reason, they often
should be, as they usually are, allowed. But sometimes we might
want to have a conversation among ourselves-among rich and
poor, owners and workers, men and women, blacks and whites-
about government leadership or about smoking or gambling or
electricity usage. If so, we might want to place restrictive terms
on business enterprises' communicative participation in the public
sphere, for example, in terms of its accuracy or its prevalence.
When we do, as a democratic nation, we should be able to do so.
It is paternalistic to think otherwise.
80 Shiffrin, supra note 30, at 1281.
s I have not made, but would like to see a comparative study of similar (e.g., western, in-
dustrialized, democratic) countries to determine if there is a (reverse) relationship between the
percent of GNP spent on advertising (or commercial speech more broadly conceived) and the
percent spent on nonn-military governmental expenditures.
82 C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 88 (Cambridge Univ. Press
2002). Actually, at the time, Proctor & Gamble was the country's largest advertiser (Philip
Morris was second) and also spent more on marketing than all the candidates combined.
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Postscript Reply to Ronald K.L. Collins & David Skover
After a generally entertaining and informative narrative of the
Nike litigation, Ronald Collins and David Skover conclude with a
disturbingly bad attempt at constitutional analysis-a point I will
illustrate only briefly here before turning to their equally bad mis-
characterization of my Essay. Their primary suggestion is that
"absent any harm to consumers [which they later make clear
means relatively direct harm to the consumer engaged in the trans-
action that the corporate speech promoted], there is little, if any,
justification for regulating the communications of sellers," largely
because then the speech is a candidate for the label of political
speech where they believe the teachings of New York Times v. Sul-
livan83 apply.84 This is simply wrong. Harm to the immediate
consumer is hardly the only harm that the Court sees as justifying
regulation of commercial speech. Consider narrowly regulating
only commercial billboards as a means to protect against an un-
sightly environment, 85 or regulating commercial solicitation to
maintain a proper dorm atmosphere, 86 or regulating utility advertis-
ing to prevent the corruption of the discourse between actual indi-
viduals concerning wise, as opposed to excessive, use of electric
87 88energy, or protecting people's privacy, or requiring support for
a federal agricultural marketing scheme. 89  Further, consider the
examples that I emphasized in this Essay pertaining to prohibitions
on corporate speech that, merely by its "loudness" (quantity), cor-
rupts the quality of public political discourse-regulations held to
be proper in Austin90 or McConnell.91 These last prohibitions on
corporate candidate-related political speech are hardly less restric-
tive on corporate participation in public discourse than rules that
" 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
84 Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Foreword, The Landmark Free-Speech Case
that Wasn't: The Nike v. Kasky Story, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 965, 1028 (2004).
85 Metromedia v. San Diego, 435 U.S. 490 (1981); see also City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512
U.S. 43, 59 n.17 (1994).
86 Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
87 Cf Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557
(1980) (indicating in dicta that this would justify a narrowly-drawn statute).
88 See LA Police Dep't v. United Publ'g Corp, 528 U.S. 32 (1999) (upholding statute re-
stricting only certain commercial users' access to govemment held information); Mainstream
Mktg. Service v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (2004) (upholding "do not call" registry that applied to
commercial but not to charitable or political calls); Bland v. Fessler, 88 F.3d 729, 738-39 (1996)
(upholding statute providing for civil liability only for commercial use of "automatic dialing and
announcing devices").
89 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Eliot, 521 U.S. 457 (1997). Whether this represents a
commercial speech case is unclear, but that is how Collins and Skover categorize it. Collins &
Skover, supra note 83, at 1024 n.269.
90 Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
91 McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 694 (2003).
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allow full participation on condition that corporate claims about
themselves-claims whose accuracy the corporation more than
anyone else should have access to evaluate-are truthful.
Worse than their simplistic, misguided account of the reasons
for regulating commercial speech is their minimal attempt to give
content to their frequently-invoked "free speech principle." In a
world where much speech is inevitably and properly regulated-
consider, to begin, perjury or verbal price fixing agreements-the
content of any free speech principle(s) must be at least implicitly
theory driven. In describing their favored approach, Collins and
Skover invoke Steve Shiffrin's powerful image of the dissenter as
the best organizing symbol of the First Amendment.92 That image
can be the touchstone of a forceful theoretical understanding, but
one searches Shiffrin's book in vain to find a place where he
would suggest Nike as exemplifying the dissenter that the First
Amendment must protect.93 Despite reporting Nike's billion dollar
budget for advertising and promotions in 199794 (and lack of rea-
son to believe Kasky's suit has caused any reduction in that
budget), Collins and Skover insist that "the law remains stacked in
favor of anti-corporate speech., 95  (Of course, neither the law in-
volved in the litigation nor any other law prevents any individ-
ual-possibly a stockholder or maybe just an ideologically pro-
corporate citizen-moved to extol the merits of either Nike or
more general corporate practices from doing so.)
Perhaps more troubling to me is Collins' and Skover's mis-
characterization of my Essay. Rather than either summarize or
reply to (or, I suspect, read96) the analysis I present, they broadly
92 Collins & Skover, supra note 83, at 1042 n.352.
93 In the book they cite, Shiffrin suggests that the "dissent value provides at least a partial
explanation for the Court's second-class treatment of commercial advertising." STEPHEN H.
SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 82 (1990). Later, in endors-
ing the romantics' view "that efforts to place limits on the excessive commercialization of
American society should be encouraged," Shiffrin argues that this shows the deep roots in tradi-
tion of "the Court rightly relegat[ing] commercial advertising to a low position in the hierarchy
of first amendment values." Id. at 152. Shiffrin then not only suggests that his perspective
makes "it easy to understand why powerful business corporations should be subjected to bur-
densome regulation when they seek to dominate political campaigns," but also that "the regula-
tion of... the large corporate conglomerate does not ordinarily inspire concern.. . that individ-
ual self-expression is at risk." Id. (emphasis added). Small wonder that Collins and Skover,
who base their defense of Nike on the possibility that its speech should be characterized as
political, suggest that Shiffrin might not agree with all that they say when they invoke his image
of the dissenter. Collins & Skover, supra note 83, at 1042 n.352.
94 Collins & Skover, supra note 83, at 976.
9- Id. at 1043.
96 Three specific points Collins and Skover make about my position suggest neither of
them read my Essay. First, they attribute my position to a "theory of free speech ostensibly
grounded in [my] notion of self-realization ...." Collins & Skover, supra note 83, at 1032
n.300 (emphasis added). The only uses of the term "self-realization" in this Essay were in a
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dismiss it with a rhetorical characterization. Their main claim-
backed up with neither argument nor example-is that my ap-
proach is "rooted more in the liberty of socialism than of capital-
ism" and "is on a collision course with the capitalism of contempo-
rary American culture and the legal system that makes that culture
possible."97 Before knowing whether to admit or deny my "social-
ist" credentials, I need to know what they mean by "the liberty of
socialism." The most socialistic claim made in my Essay is that
government regulation of business enterprises is, under existing
law, often constitutionally permissible. If this is what Collins and
Skover mean by socialism, they must consider everyone from
Holmes to Rehnquist to be socialists. If distinguishing one's
views from those of the majority in Lochner makes a person a so-
cialist, the label surely has no sting worth considering.
As for their claim that my approach is "on a collision course
with ... the legal system that makes [capitalist] culture possible,"
or their further claim that my theory "seems extreme" because my
free speech principles are not those of "the American commercial
culture, 98 two observations seem appropriate. First, in this Essay
footnote quotation of an opinion written by Justice White where he endorses the notion's impor-
tance, see supra note 24, and in reference to an article that had that term in its title. Moreover,
though I do refer to having previously developed an explanation of why a robust theory of free
speech would not offer any protection to commercial speech, see articles cited supra note 9, I
think I made clear that this theory is not the subject of this Essay. Rather, this Essay largely
accepts, for purposes of the present analysis, all existing Supreme Court First Amendment case
law and its most important "black letter" doctrine and proceeds to suggest how it can be best
understood-rather than argue that it should be rejected as I had argued in earlier writings.
Collins's and Skover's rejection of my prior writings on the subject is simply irrelevant to the
current Essay. Second, they report as one of my positions a claim that my "self-realization
principle is inapplicable to for-profit corporations, other than for-profit corporations that trade in
speech." Collins & Skover, supra note 83, at 1032 n.301 (emphasis in original). Actually, I
argue here (as I have consistently since my first article on commercial speech) that media enter-
prises receive First Amendment protection because of their absolutely vital instrumental role in
service of democracy, broadly conceived. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43; sources
cited supra note 9. Neither in this Essay nor in any earlier work do I say that the self-realization
principle is applicable "to for-profit corporations that trade in speech." Third, they "wonder"
whether my approach would protect (and, if I read them right, suggest it would) the individual
defendants (officers and/or directors) in Nike because I make the identity of the speaker crucial.
They seem not to have noticed my extensive attention to the point that the role of a speaker has
been consistently treated by the courts as crucial to whether her speech is fully protected or is
considered less protected commercial speech. See supra notes 37, 44-47 and accompanying
text. (Their view that this creates some problem, either for me or the law, suggests a woeful
ignorance of the case law as well as of my analysis.) In other words, virtually everything
Collins and Skover say about my position involves positions that I did not advance in this Essay
or involves questions that I specifically answered in the Essay. Finally, I should note that, al-
though this fault might be excused due to the obvious sketchiness of their conclusion, they to-
tally ignore rather than answer my critique of virtually all their affirmative claims-for exam-
ple, that protection of Nike is required because its speech is political or required in order to
avoid handicapping one side in the public debate.
97 Collins & Skover, supra note 83, at 1032 n.300 (emphasis added).
98 Id.
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I have primarily described the possible logic of existing Supreme
Court precedent, which, I argue, fully justifies the California Su-
preme Court's approval of allowing Kasky's legal challenge to
Nike's allegedly false speech to go forward. Absent objections to
my interpretation or explanation of existing Supreme Court cases,
I can see no possible collision course with the legal system. Sec-
ond, if their characterization is based instead on my earlier, inten-
tionally more exploratory, theoretical writings where I do argue
that non-media corporate speech does not merit First Amendment
protection, it should be observed that my conclusion was virtually
unchallenged in American courts until the last quarter of the twen-
tieth century. That is, my view certainly lived comfortably with
the commercial culture that Collins and Skover are likely to agree
existed in the country even before 1976. And as for my purported
extremism, my conclusions about commercial speech were shared
by great free speech theorists and judges ranging from John Stuart
Mill, Justice Hugo Black, Alexander Meiklejohn, and Thomas
Emerson. As for my first amendment views more generally, I am
probably more properly criticized for the extremism of my defense
of free speech. In the end, I am inclined, until I see more argu-
ment, to conclude that Collins and Skover ignored my present Es-
say and could only resort to a rhetorical ad hominem rejection of
my earlier more theoretical analyses because those analyses are
persuasive.
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